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“A GIFT FROM GOD”: 
Alexandros Nafpliotis
Abstract: The focus of this article is an analysis of the Greek junta’s relations with the 
Wilson and Heath governments in the United Kingdom from 1967 to 1974. Emphasis 
is placed on diplomatic relations between the two traditional allies. The reactions of the 
military leaders of the regime in Athens and its representatives in Britain to policies 
pursued by London towards the establishment, consolidation and eventual demise of 
the colonels’ dictatorship are presented through the examination (for the first time) of 
official documents from both the UK and Greece. It is argued that the Greek military 
regime struggled to cultivate relations with Britain primarily for reasons of domestic and 
international prestige. Whereas Whitehall pursued a policy of “good working relations” 
with the junta in order to promote British interests vis-à-vis NATO, Cyprus and trade, 
the leadership in Athens was solely interested in using British support to gain legitimacy 
internationally and domestically.
“[...] εφ’oσον αμφότεραι χώραι παραμένουν πισταί εις ΝΑΤΟ και δυτικός προσανατολισμός 
Ελλάδος δεν παύει αποτελή βασικήν αρχήν πολιτικής, δι’ην Μεγάλη Βρεταννία 
είχε πολεμήση, Επανάστασις θα έδει να θεωρήται υπό Βρεταννικής Κυβερνήσεως 
ως θείον δώρον.”
[(…) since both countries are still loyal to NATO and Greece’s Western orientation 
remains one of its basic political tenets, the Revolution should be considered by the British 
Government as a gift from God.]1
I. Introduction
Although it has been more than 40 years since the collapse of the Greek 
colonels’ dictatorship, sober and well-documented analyses of the foreign 
policy of the regime have only recently started to appear.2 The fact that the 
1 Greek Ambassador to London P. Verykios to Foreign Secretary George Brown, cited 
in the Archives of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs [hereafter MFA]: London Embassy 
files [hereafter LE], 1967/2.4 part 1/2 no. 4941/ΣΤ/2-Α/1 Verykios to MFA, 12-9-1967.
2 Sotiris Rizas, “Εξωτερική πολιτική και Κυπριακό” [Foreign policy and the Cyprus 
Question], in V. Karamanolakis (ed.), Η στρατιωτική δικτατορία, 1967-1974 [The military 
dictatorship, 1967-1974], Athens 2010, pp. 115-128; Sotiris Walldén, Παράταιροι εταίροι. Ελ-
ληνική δικτατορία, κομμουνιστικά καθεστώτα και Βαλκάνια, 1967-1974 [Unseemly partners: 
Greek dictatorship, communist regimes and the Balkans, 1967-1974], Athens 2009; Alexandros 
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investigation of the junta’s relations with the superpowers (and especially 
the United States) is self-evident has left little room for the development 
of a literature around the colonels’ foreign policy towards other important 
states which played a significant part within the general context of the Cold 
War, as well as the context of a regional political or military organization. 
The way the junta considered relations with a traditional ally who had had a 
seminal role in Greek politics since the creation of the Greek State, and who 
was a prominent member of NATO and (since 1973) the European Economic 
Community, is of particular importance. 
The Slippery Road to Dictatorship
In the 1960s, relations between London and Athens were still in the long 
shadow of the Cyprus Question. During the early 1960s, however, the Anglo-
Greek connection suffered primarily because of London’s unwillingness to 
commit to NATO funding to Greece. This stance was anchored to the belief that 
Britain did not have particularly vital strategic interests in Greece (in relation 
to Middle Eastern countries such as Turkey)3 and Whitehall’s realization of 
its constantly shrinking economic capabilities.4 Harold Wilson’s election as 
prime minister coincided with George Papandreou’s brief stint at the helm 
Nafpliotis, “Οι αετοί, το λιοντάρι, το σφυροδρέπανο και ο φοίνικας. Οι εξωτερικές σχέσεις 
της Ελλάδας αμέσως πριν και κατά τη διάρκεια της δικτατορίας των συνταγματαρχών” [The 
eagles, the lion, the hammer and sickle and the phoenix: Greece’s foreign relations immediately 
before and during the colonels’ dictatorship], Μνήμων 33 (2014), pp. 257-264, and id., “The 
1971 Reestablishment of Diplomatic Relations between Greece and Albania: Cooperation 
and Strategic Partnership within Cold War Bipolarity?”, in O. Anastasakis, D. Bechev and N. 
Vrousalis (eds), Greece in the Balkans: Memory, Conflict and Exchange, Newcastle: Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing, 2009, pp. 118-134. See also the slightly older works on the subject: Sotiris 
Rizas, Οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες, η δικτατορία των συνταγματαρχών και το Κυπριακό ζήτημα, 
1967-1974 [The United States, the dictatorship of the colonels and the Cyprus Question, 1967-
1974], Athens 2002, and Vassilis Pesmazoglu, “Ελληνική δικτατορία (1967-1974) και ΕΟΚ. 
Οικονομία, πολιτική, ιδεολογία” [The Greek dictatorship (1967-1974) and the EEC: Economics, 
politics, ideology], in G. Athanasatou et al., Η δικτατορία, 1967-1974. Πολιτικές πρακτικές – 
ιδεολογικός λόγος – αντίσταση [The dictatorship, 1967-1974: Politics – ideology – resistance], 
Athens 1999, pp. 92-114.
3 See, for example, references in William Mallinson’s books, Cyprus: Diplomatic History 
and the Clash of Theory in International Relations, London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2010, 
p. 96, and Britain and Cyprus: Key Themes and Documents since World War II, London and 
New York: I. B. Tauris, 2011, p. 23.
4 Sotiris Rizas, Η Ελλάδα, οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες και η Ευρώπη, 1961-1964 [Greece, the 
US and Europe, 1961-1964], Athens: Patakis, 2001 pp. 102-103.
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of Greek politics. The seminal events of July 1965 and the subsequent (three 
failed) endeavours for the formation of a government in Athens were viewed 
with great interest and anxiety in Britain.5 More specifically, during the crisis 
of 1965, the British ambassador, Sir Ralph Murray, condemned Papandreou’s 
actions and London (not ignoring British and Greek royal ties) seemed to 
be clearly taking King Constantine’s side. British fears were not palliated 
even after Papandreou’s fall, as Stephanos Stephanopoulos’ government was 
considered fragile, but relations ameliorated considerably in 1966 with the 
Greek foreign minister expressing the view that they were now more cordial 
than ever since 1945.6
It was as early as the beginning of that year that British diplomats were 
discussing the possibility of a right-wing coup taking place in Greece.7 
Foreign Office (FO, or FCO after 1968) officials were struck by the equanimity 
with which Greeks regarded that possibility, and, although they had no 
recent indications that a coup was imminent, they were eager to ascertain 
the stance of two traditionally important factors in Greek postwar politics: a) 
what was the position of the US Embassy and local CIA staff vis-à-vis right-
wing elements in Greece, as well as the general policy to be followed by the 
US; and b) whether King Constantine remained resolutely opposed to an 
extra-parliamentary solution.8 As a memorandum produced for a meeting of 
Wilson with Constantine reveals, an “extra-parliamentary solution” initiated 
5 For a sober discussion of the July 1965 events and the lead-up to the junta, see J. 
Meynaud, Οι πολιτικές δυνάμεις στην Ελλάδα [The political forces in Greece], Vol. II, 
Athens: Savvalas, 2002, and especially pp. 72-210. For a protagonist’s take on events, see 
Andreas Papandreou’s account and especially his reference to the British being “openly 
hostile” to him and his father in the immediate pre-coup period (Η Δημοκρατία στο 
απόσπασμα [Democracy at gunpoint], Athens 2006, p. 362).
6 The National Archives of the United Kingdom [hereafter NA]: Foreign Office files 
[hereafter FO, or FCO after 1968], 371/185666 Record of conversation, George Thompson 
and Ioannis Toumbas, 12-9-1966.
7 The British ambassador had reported something along those lines on 19 February, 
and a “strong likelihood of a right-wing coup” had also been identified by two British MPs 
who had visited Greece in May 1966 (NA: FO 371/185677/CE1631/6 Letter, H. A. F. Hohler, 
FO to Murray, Athens, 27-6-1966). What is more, Washington had received information 
reports on a Greek military conspiratorial group as early as March 1966 (Field Information 
Report, Athens, December 20, 1966, cited in James E. Miller (ed.), Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1964-1968, Vol. XVI, Washington, DC, 2000, document 245); it is hard to 
believe, given the degree of cooperation between the two allies, that the Americans had 
not informed the British of this valuable piece of information.
8 FO 371/185677/CE1631/6 Letter, Hohler to Murray, 27-6-1966.
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by the right but opposed by the king, who was nonetheless under considerable 
pressure from his immediate entourage to yield, was considered a possible 
reaction to a feared victory of the Centre Union in future elections.9 As for 
the leader of the opposition, he appeared to have been persuaded by the king 
that the coup plotters would not dare move without royal assent and that the 
latter was not forthcoming.10 
The memorandum made clear that it was in the British government’s 
interests that there should be a strong and stable Greek government able to 
maintain the status quo on four main issues: Cyprus, Greek participation in 
NATO, British commercial interests and the containment of the communist 
threat in Greece. London, although secretly aware that a resounding victory 
of George (and Andreas) Papandreou would have been “worrying for us” 
as it “might well have led to anarchy in Greece and at least a disturbing 
weakening of Greece’s membership of the NATO alliance”, did not play any 
role in easing the junta’s ascent to power; the final conclusion reached by the 
British diplomat who authored the memorandum was that, “a continuation 
of the present, albeit delicate, political situation in Greece seems preferable”.11
By the end of the year, though, circumstances had changed in Greece. King 
Constantine (also under the stress created by the revelations surrounding 
the ASPIDA affair and Andreas Papandreou’s alleged involvement in 
that) no longer seemed willing to avoid any kind of “deviation from the 
political order”, fearing that the Centre Union leader’s firebrand son would 
shake the very foundations of Greece’s postwar political establishment, by 
posing a challenge to three basic pillars: the special role of the monarchy, 
the country’s devotion to the Western Alliance and the protracted political 
isolation of the communist left.12 Andreas’ fall out with his father over a pact 
with conservative leader Panayotis Kanellopoulos, coupled with the younger 
Papandreou’s fiery rhetoric against the US, the palace and Greek élites, served 
as a catalyst for fanning the flames of Greece’s already turbulent politics. 
In the spring of 1967, Ioannis Paraskevopoulos’ government collapsed, 
and an interim government to take the country to elections in May was 
formed under Kanellopoulos. The latter, when asked by US ambassador to 
Athens Phillips Talbot about his reaction to a possible Centre Union victory, 
9 NA: Prime Minister files [hereafter PREM], 13/2139 Memorandum on the Greek political 
situation, 8-11-1966. 
10 Stan Draenos, Andreas Papandreou: The Making of a Greek Democrat and Political 
Maverick, London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2012, p. 202.
11 PREM 13/2139 Memorandum on the Greek political situation, 8-11-1966. 
12 Draenos, Andreas Papandreou, pp. 208-226.
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declared that, “the Greek nation would never be delivered to the communists 
or to Andreas Papandreou. It would be saved for real democracy.”13 Only two 
days before, though, the serving Greek prime minister had sent a circular to 
Greek embassies around the world, castigating reports in the international 
press about alleged “dictatorial tendencies” and “deviation intent” in Greece, 
and asking representatives of the Greek State abroad to react strongly against 
similar instances in the future.14 
II. Establishment
1967
Two weeks later, the imposition of a military dictatorship of lower-ranking 
officials in Athens was a fact. The British Embassy was in a much more apt 
position to judge developments in Athens than other European embassies, 
given its good level of contacts and expertise.15 The first dispatches from the 
embassy in Athens to the FO after that date are quite revealing of the extent 
that Britain was aware of a putsch conceived by lower-rank officers. Although 
Sir Ralph Murray confessed that he knew that “a group of extremist officers 
decided in January to go underground and organise military measures to 
solve the political problem”, information was more than blurry and he held 
that “the plotters [were] unrepresentative and that their measures [were] 
inexpert and [might] not be sustained for very long”.16 Quite indicative of the 
lack of foreknowledge of the coup by the British Embassy was the following 
telegram from Murray: the British ambassador wrote to London that he had 
no information whether General Georgios Zoitakis and Brigadier Stylianos 
13 Telegram number [hereafter tel. no.] 4569 from Athens, 7-4-1967, cited in Miller 
(ed.), Foreign Relations, Vol. XVI, document 268. 
14 LE 1967/2.4 part 2/2 no. Υ01-49, Kanellopoulos to MFA, 5-4-1967. 
15 The Swiss ambassador, for example, had to rely on the British in order to notify Bern 
about the coup as communications at his embassy had broken down (Diplomatic Documents 
of Switzerland, Junte militaire en Grèce, 381.0, Étienne Bourgnon, Athens, to Willy Spühler, 
Federal Department for Foreign Affairs, 23-4-1967). Interestingly enough, though, while 
Bourgnon reported that his German, French, Israeli, Yugoslav and Japanese colleagues were 
surprised by the coup, no such mention was made by the British ambassador – even though 
the two embassies were in close cooperation, as stated above. 
16 FCO 9/124 Murray to FO, tel. no. 275, 21-4-1967. A month later he conceded that he 
“became aware in January of a Colonel Papadopoulos plotting, having declared that the 
time for military action had come” (FCO 9/126 Memorandum on Coup in Greece, Murray 
to Brown, 23-5-1967). 
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Pattakos were also active in the coup.17 It was only much later that afternoon 
that Murray managed to gather more detailed information on the actual 
perpetrators.18 It appears then that Whitehall was not anticipating a military 
overthrow of the government of this kind.
The first serious consideration of London’s policy towards Greece following 
the coup came as an immediate response to a change of the political situation 
in a country considered for many years a traditional ally. Only a week after 
the tanks had filled the roads of Athens, Prime Minister Wilson suggested to 
Foreign Secretary George Brown that they should be thinking how to strengthen 
the opposition to the regime and to give support to the king, thus securing 
“the return of a non-Communist constitutional government before resistance 
[became] an exclusively Communist prerogative”. Brown, in his reply, declared 
that developments in Greece were of major importance for two main reasons: 
first, because of Greece’s key position in NATO and in the Mediterranean, and 
secondly because of Cyprus.19 The foreign secretary, however, distinguished 
his views from Wilson’s, saying that overt assistance to the king and, indeed, 
any political meddling would be inexpedient, as it would lead the colonels into 
further isolation and harden their stance. He therefore introduced what was to 
become the unofficial doctrine of the FO in relation to Greece for at least the 
next three years: that cautious and measured cooperation would modify the 
regime.20 As far as the king was concerned, the decision, taken after consultation 
with Dean Rusk, the US Secretary of State, was that he was to be supported fully 
but unobtrusively. The British government, however, remained perplexed in its 
effort to maintain a balanced attitude towards the fledgling military junta and 
its old friends in Greece.
In his attempt to draw a successful policy, the foreign secretary wished to 
gain access to first-hand information regarding both the general attitude of the 
17 FCO 9/124 Murray to FO, tel. no. 276, 21-4-1967.
18 Ibid., tel. no. 284, 21-4-1967, and tel. no. 295, 22-4-1967.
19 PREM 13/2140 Minute by H. Wilson, 1-5-67. 
20 On this, compare also the judgement of the West German ambassador to Athens on 
the military regime: “[Despite the violation of legality,] it cannot be denied that the attempt 
to eliminate the communist threat, whether imminent or latent, was, in principle, in the 
interest of the Western alliance as well as in accordance with our specific German interests.” 
(Cited in “Botschafter Schlitter, Athen, an das Auswärtige Amt”, no. 177, Schlitter to Bonn, 
20-5-1967, in Ilse Dorothee Pautsch, Jürgen Klöckler and Harald Rosenbach, 1967. Akten 
zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Berlin and Boston: Oldenbourg 
Wissenschaftsverlag, 2013. Retrieved 14 November 2014, from http://www.degruyter.com/
view/product/223143). 
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colonels and the state of public opinion in Greece. He therefore regularly asked 
the British ambassador in Athens for an up-to-date evaluation of the political and 
social situation. The first major instance of such coordination of views occurred 
a few days after the coup d’état and resulted in Sir Ralph Murray’s advice of 
“do[ing] business with the regime and try[ing] to push them into a suitable 
political evolution”.21 The ambassador’s recommendation to proceed with a 
normal working relationship on the spot was coupled with the possibility of 
using the strength of feeling in Britain about the coup as one way of pushing the 
colonels in the right direction. Brown commented that, “that could be combined 
with a certain aloofness, for example in having no British Ministers visit Greece 
[…] until the regime had evolved into something more respectable”.22 
Meanwhile, in Athens, the regime had already started to show its 
credentials: the Greek Central Intelligence Agency (KYP) informed all 
Greek embassies that a multiplication of the illegal activities of the Greek 
Communist Party was expected and sent them “request for information lists” 
that had to do with communist activities. In other words, the Greek Embassy 
in London (along with others around Europe) was turned into a spying office 
in the service of the dictatorship, and communist sympathisers, such as the 
Ambatielos,23 were closely monitored.24 The colonels were, however, able 
to get support (be it tacit or active) for their so-called “Revolution” from a 
variety of sources, amongst whom was Labour MP Francis Noel-Baker. 
International Developments
Subsequent international and domestic incidents worked in favour of the 
colonels. The Six-Day War, the outbreak of which came less than 50 days 
after the coup in Greece, played a significant role in allaying the fears of 
21 PREM 13/2140 Record of a meeting between the Foreign Secretary and H.M. Ambassador, 
Athens, 3-5-67.
22 Ibid. 
23 Tony Ambatielos was the leader of a communist-led maritime union who had found 
refuge in Britain and married Betty Bartlett, a significant figure of the British communist 
movement. Betty Ambatielos became a prominent figure of the opposition to the colonels, 
with the Greek Embassy identifying her as a narrator for an “incredibly anti-Greek” 
documentary on Greece aired on ITV in December 1967 (LE 1967/2.1 part 2/2 no. 1283/Φ.4, 
Roussen, London to Prime Minister’s office, 12-12-1967). 
24 LE 1967/2.4 part 1/2 no. Θ-804926, Chatzipetros, KYP to MFA, 29-5-1967. On this, see 
also the revelations that came to light after the fall of the junta, “Άνθρωποι της χούντας 
κατασκόπευαν τους Έλληνες φοιτητές στην Ευρώπη” [Junta’s men were spying on Greek 
students in Europe], Ριζοσπάστης (26 September 1974).
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especially Western, US and NATO, officials.25 The “widespread concern” 
that the Defence Secretary, Denis Healey, on 31 May had admitted that all 
members of the NATO Alliance felt, soon changed to predilection towards 
the junta, due to their upgraded status as the only tried-and-true Western 
ally in the wider region apart from Israel.26 As a consequence, the issue of the 
Cyprus dispute also became a matter of priority for the Western Alliance, 
which made efforts, especially through the British, to persuade the two 
parties (i.e. Greece and Turkey at the time) to take bolder steps towards a 
peaceful settlement. While war in the Middle East was raging, Noel-Baker, 
quite characteristically, wrote to the Greek foreign minister to say that he was 
“very much distressed by the bad image Greece continue[d] to be given by 
[the British] press, and the unfortunate impressions that have gained ground 
in political circles [in Britain]”. The British Labour politician even went on 
to request a meeting with Prime Minister Konstantinos Kollias and Colonel 
Georgios Papadopoulos, in order to “make certain specific suggestions about 
publicity and public relations, and also about possible visits to Greece by 
political and other British personalities”.27 It should be said that was not the 
first time that Noel-Baker chose to offer his services to the Greek government; 
he had also done so in connection with Cyprus and Greek-Turkish talks over 
the fate of the island in the summer of 1966, causing alarm in FO officials and 
especially the British ambassador in Athens, who thought that it was “not the 
time for private diplomacy which might indeed mess things up”.28
Given this background, it is understandable why it was imperative for 
London to establish a rapport with the representative of the Greek government 
in London. After a small hiatus, Panayotis Verykios succeeded Demetrios 
Nicolareisis29 and was immediately received by Brown (a fact Verykios 
considered particularly flattering). The foreign secretary asked his interlocutor 
to convey the message that Britain’s position would be much easier if the 
25 On the Mediterranean during the Cold War and détente, see Effie G. H. Pedaliu, 
“Fault Lines in the Post-War Mediterranean and the ‘Birth of Southern Europe’, 1945-
1979: An Overview”, in E. Calandri, D. Caviglia and A. Varsori (eds), Detente in Cold War 
Europe: Politics and Diplomacy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, London and 
New York: I. B. Tauris, 2014, pp. 15-31.
26 FCO 9/148 Oral answer from Mr Healey to Mr Gardner, 31-5-1967. 
27 LE 1967/2.4 part 1/2 Francis Noel-Baker to Paul Economou-Gouras, MFA, 6-6-1967.
28 FO 371/185677 Ralph Murray, Athens, to Sir Paul Gore-Booth, FC, 16-7-1966. 
29 See “Μεταθέσεις και τοποθετήσεις πρεσβευτών εις τας κυριωτέρας ελληνικάς πρεσ-
βείας” [Ambassadorial transfers and positions in major Greek embassies], Μακεδονία (10 
January 1967), and “State Intelligence”, The London Gazette, no. 44444 (3 November 1967).
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junta avoided further arrests, released political prisoners and re-established a 
parliamentary democracy, only to receive a strongly worded reply by the Greek 
ambassador: Verykios stated that, since both countries were in NATO and 
Greece’s Western orientation remained one of its basic tenets, the junta should 
be considered by London as a “gift from God” (“[...] Επανάστασις θα έδει να 
θεωρήται υπό Βρεταννικής Κυβερνήσεως ως θείον δώρον” in the original). 
The final conclusion of the Greek diplomat was that Brown was primarily 
anxious lest Greek domestic developments cause the British government any 
trouble.30 This way, the Greek ambassador conveyed to Athens what the Labour 
government considered a major obstacle to having proper relations with a 
right-wing military regime; that is, mostly parliamentary and public opinion 
pressure to condemn a military dictatorship in another European country – 
especially at a time when Whitehall was facing severe criticism, following the 
impetus of the demonstrations against the Vietnam War.31 Notwithstanding 
this, what also became apparent from the meeting was that Verykios was not 
going to be a very good channel of communication with the Greek government, 
for he was considered to stand to the right of the colonels.32
Party Conference and Street Demonstrations
Reactions to the imposition of a dictatorship in Greece came to a head in 
early October when the Labour Party Conference at Scarborough passed 
a resolution asking for the expulsion of Greece from such European 
organizations as the Council of Europe until the military dictatorship gave 
way to viable and proper democracy.33 The Greek government responded 
through the newspaper that was expressing its views, Ελεύθερος Κόσμος, 
which claimed that some members of the Labour Party were influenced 
by communist propaganda and had, wittingly or unwittingly, assisted the 
Soviet State in the past and were now doing so again. The article concluded 
by suggesting that, “the British people were sensitive about democracy, but 
they should confine their sensitivity to their own country”.34 As a result, and 
under subsequent pressure from Athens, the British (Labour) government 
30 LE 1967/2.4 part 1/2 no. 4941/ΣΤ/2-Α/1 Verykios to MFA, 12-9-1967.
31 Alexandros Nafpliotis, Britain and the Colonels, London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 
2012, p. 18.
32 FCO 9/228 “View of the new Greek Ambassador to London”, Davidson to Dodson, n.d. 
33 LE 1967/3.3 part 1/2 The Labour Party Annual Conference 1967, Agenda page 72, 
“Greece” (Composite Resolution), n.d.
34 Cited in FCO 9/148 Sir Michael Stewart to FO, tel. no. 28, 17-10-1967.
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decided to ignore the resolution of the conference. This was perfectly in line 
with the general ambience for, as Woodhouse has argued, “throughout the 
dictatorship it was the various vehicles of public opinion rather than the 
executive authorities that sustained the resistance” to military rule.35 
Only a few days later, though, the Greek ambassador was forced to report to 
Athens that a group of 20 Brits (”mostly thugs”) had demonstrated outside the 
embassy with pickets that read “Save democracy in Greece”.36 Verykios assured the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the event was of particularly minor importance, 
but a series of similar events followed in early November with demonstrators 
(after failing to approach the US Embassy nearby) throwing white paint at the 
embassy door and later removing the embassy’s sign from the entrance.37 The 
ambassador complained to the FO and personally to its permanent under-
secretary about the British police’s negligence to perform their duty.38 Sir Paul 
Gore-Booth deplored the incident and promised to conduct an investigation to 
guarantee that something like that would not happen again.39
The Greek ambassador in London was more successful when it came to the 
argument he used in order to persuade Whitehall to cultivate a “good working 
relationship” with Athens; namely, Greece’s geopolitical significance in the 
context of the Cold War. As Verykios told Lord Hood (responsible for NATO 
at the FO): 
Since military preparedness, as history and the very existence of 
NATO have proven, is the most effective deterrent of war, countries 
whose geographical position is of great strategic importance should 
be greatly valued. For, ignoring this principle serves the expansionist 
aims of the West’s enemies and has catastrophic consequences. […] I 
hope that our allies in NATO, and especially Turkey, whose isolation 
would be complete in case Greece fell to the communist camp, will 
constantly keep in mind the importance of the Greek factor.40
35 C. M. Woodhouse, The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, London: Granada, 1985, p. 40.
36 LE 1967/2.1 part 1/2 no. 5798/ΣΤ/2 Verykios to MFA, 16-10-1967.
37 Ibid., no. 6215/ΣΤ/2 Verykios to MFA, 4-11-1967.
38 Ibid., no. 6278/ΣΤ/2 Verykios to MFA, 6-11-1967.
39 Ibid. It should be noted here that, at the time, another similar incident was the 
subject of correspondence between the FO and the Home Office: a group of demonstrators 
had broken into the Greek Embassy exactly a week after the coup d’état. A young Brit 
was sentenced to six months in prison, causing the reaction of the Home Secretary, who 
thought that was severe and thus asked the FO whether he could release him immediately. 
FO officials replied saying that “[b]reaking the immunity of diplomatic premises is an 
activity we all deplore […] this view should not be affected by the nature of the government 
in question” (FCO 9/225 Speaking notes, attached to Davidson to Maitland, 21-12-1967).
40 LE 1967/2.1 part 1/2 no. 6550/ΣΤ/2 Verykios to MFA, 17-11-1967.
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III. Consolidation
The King Takes Action
Less than a month later, nevertheless, King Constantine instigated an 
abortive counter-coup, the upshot of which was that the king fled to Rome 
and the colonels tightened their grip on the country.41 London seemed to be 
completely unaware of the counter-coup and had difficulty even identifying 
what had triggered off the king’s action.42 This, though, does not appear to 
be the whole truth. The Labour government, accused of a “royal fixation”, 
was thought of as “see[ing] the King, with the support of the Right, as the 
medium for a return from dictatorship”.43 Furthermore, as correspondence 
between the embassy in Athens and the Foreign Office reveals, London 
was warned about the possibility of a counter-coup well in advance. The 
British appraisal of the post-coup situation, as far as the disavowal of any 
immediate reaction to the colonels’ military takeover was concerned, proved 
to be correct. However, on 21 September, the FO did not pay much attention 
to “a reliable British source whose confidence must be respected” who was 
personally informed (albeit “in rather vague and ill-thought terms”) by King 
Constantine about the latter’s “ordering the General commanding Larissa 
District to stage a counter coup”.44 According to the British ambassador’s 
assessment of the situation one month later, the king would not “willingly 
risk attempting to overthrow [the colonels] in favour of bringing back some 
political personality, even supposing that his chances of succeeding in such a 
move were greater than [at the time] they appear[ed] to be”.45 
It seems, nevertheless, that the king’s fascination had ceased to appeal to 
British officials, who held that he had lost “his traditional role as a stabilising 
factor in national life” by then.46 As a consequence, and lest the British find 
themselves “in the middle of a Greek political storm” without helping in the 
restoration of democracy in the country, Sir Michael Stewart recommended 
against providing support to Constantine.47 In addition, London had been 
informed (less than a month before the actual counter-coup) that the king was 
“certainly not ready for a direct confrontation with the Colonels yet, whether 
41 “Junta in Greece Firmly in Power after Coup Fails”, The New York Times (15 December 
1967).
42 FCO 9/139 Speaking notes on Cabinet meeting on Greece, 14-12-1967.
43 “Greek Pressure Points”, The Guardian (26 September 1967).
44 FCO 9/120 Sir Michael Stewart to FO, tel. no. 1007, 21-9-1967.
45 FCO 9/120 Memorandum on “The Greek Internal Scene”, Stewart to Brown, 19-10-1967.
46 Ibid.
47 FCO 9/120 Letter, Sir Michael Stewart to Sir Paul Gore-Booth, 24-10-1967.
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by bringing the Army in or otherwise” [emphasis added].48 The files of the 
archives of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs reveal that Sir John G. S. Beith 
expressed the hope that an agreement for Constantine’s quick return would 
be reached, admitting that this would ease the work of Greece’s friends and 
increase the prestige of the regime abroad.49 Consultations with other NATO 
allies (the French, the West Germans and, most importantly, the Americans), 
in the light, however, of the anxiety “lest the junta began to feel that [it] 
could exist without [Britain]” and, consequently, become “less inclined in 
the future to pay heed to what [London said]”,50 led to the postponement of 
recognition until after the New Year.51 After the failure of the counter-coup, 
a “window of opportunity” of resisting the colonels seemed to close, with 
reactions to the establishment of a dictatorship fading as a consequence of the 
junta’s consolidation and a series of successive events in the wider region of 
Eastern Europe and the Middle East: most significantly the Six-Day War of 
1967, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, as well as the removal of allied 
bases from Libya, and anti-American demonstrations in Italy and Turkey in 
the last quarter of 1969.52 Finally, criticism that the British government was 
condoning military rule by dealing with the new government grew and grew, 
only to be countered with the expression of the familiar point that “dealing 
with a government is not the same thing as approving it”.53 This declaration 
marked the beginning of a series of demarcations that distinguished between 
adopting a tough stance towards the junta, primarily for public consumption, 
and fully cooperating with them. The reasons that led London to take that 
approach in relation to the military dictatorship were not inconspicuous to 
the Greeks. In January 1968, Britain’s financial anaemia was making headlines 
even in Athens, where journalists were arguing that the country was turning 
into “little” Britain and were wondering whether “God would save England”.54 
48 FCO 9/120 Letter, Sir Michael Stewart to Sir John G. S. Beith, 17-11-1967.
49 LE/1967/2.1 part 1/2 Verykios to MFA, no. 8071/ST/2, 30-12-1967.
50 FCO 9/139 Sir Michael Stewart to FO, tel. no. 1406, 20-12-1967.
51 See also “Western Powers Rebuff Greek Bid for Recognition”, The New York Times 
(16 December 1967).
52 C. Svolopoulos, Η ελληνική εξωτερική πολιτική, 1945-1981 [Greek foreign policy, 1945-
1981], Athens 2001, p. 169.
53 FCO 9/132, tel. no. 102, 30-1-1968.
54 “Αυτοκρατορία τέλος” [The end of empire], Εμπρός (20 January 1968). See also “Το 
Ρέκβιεμ μιας υπερδυνάμεως” [The requiem of a superpower], Μακεδονία (28 January 1968).
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1968
The second year of the colonels seemed to have started as they had wished: 
they had consolidated their power domestically after King Constantine 
“delivered his people into [their] hands”,55 and they had resumed normal 
diplomatic relations with all their neighbours and the major powers. Having 
said that, when Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart saw the Greek ambassador, 
he did make an effort to express Whitehall’s desire to see democracy restored 
in Greece. Verykios said he assumed that “the colonels were men of honour 
and [would] carry out this pledge to provide a constitution”. However, what 
worried Stewart and starkly exemplified the difference in mentality between 
the Greek and the British was Verykios’ final comment: “[The] Colonels, he 
sa[id], claim they are honest men, unlike politicians.” The British foreign 
secretary replied by saying: “[…] I distrust these blanket attacks on politicians 
– if politicians are swept away what is left but armed force?”56 It is worth 
noting that, despite the imposition of the dictatorship, British Embassy 
officials (like officials from other Western embassies) still managed to be in 
close contact with a number of Greek politicians who provided them with 
valuable information.57
Events, however, were to take a slightly different turn and international 
developments again played a significant role. The Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in late August to counter the impending reforms of the 
Prague Spring, and the increased fear of a continuing communist threat 
which this engendered, emphasized in Greece by Soviet naval activity in the 
Mediterranean, led to a further reconsideration of Britain’s policy towards 
the colonels.58 A month after Warsaw Pact tanks entered Prague, FCO officials 
thought that it would be helpful if Manlio Brosio, the General Secretary 
of NATO, spoke to the Greek foreign minister about the situation in the 
country.59 Lord Hood, however, the following day said that there were certain 
reasons that made the FCO hesitant. These were: 1) the fact that there was to 
55 FCO 9/838 “Annual review for 1968”, Sir Michael Stewart, 10-1-1969.
56 John W. Young, “The Diary of Michael Stewart as British Foreign Secretary, April-
May 1968”, Contemporary British History 19/4 (2005), p. 488.
57 Ioannis Varvitsiotis, Όπως τα έζησα, 1961-1981 [The way I experienced events, 1961-
1981], Athens 2012, p. 200.
58 FCO 9/870 Memorandum for the Secretary of State’s meeting with Sir Michael Stewart, 
7-11-1968. See also C. Svolopoulos (ed.), Κωνσταντίνος Καραμανλής. Αρχείο, γεγονότα και 
κείμενα [Constantinos Karamanlis: Archive, facts and texts], Vol. VI, Athens: Ekdotiki 
Athinon, 1995, p. 80.
59 FCO 9/166 Memorandum on Greece and NATO by Davidson, 17-9-1968.
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be a referendum in Greece by the end of the month and London would like 
to see its result before it took action; 2) the American attitude, which was then 
favourable to the colonels; and 3) the attitude of other NATO powers.60 Three 
days later, the under-secretary for foreign affairs responsible for international 
organizations within the FCO met the Greek ambassador to discuss the Greek 
Question in the Council of Europe (CoE). Lord Hood assured Verykios that 
his government was opposed to the expulsion of Greece and that it would 
make an effort to avoid any discussion on the issue on a governmental level; 
if that were to fail, London would try to “bury” the issue at the Council of 
Ministers, which, in any case, was not scheduled to meet before the following 
May.61 It is interesting to note here, furthermore, that at this stage, British 
officials were opposed to a voluntary Greek withdrawal from the CoE, with 
Lord Hood describing it as a “mistake” that would provide the “enemies” of 
the regime the opportunity to claim a victory. The principal reasons given for 
this were: “a) because ‘LES ABSENTS ONT TOUJOURS TORT’ and b) because 
it would be equal to a public acknowledgment of their alleged guilt and their 
inability to defend their views”.62
Events in Eastern Europe played a significant part, as the war in the Middle 
East had one year before, in Western perceptions of the Greek dictatorship. 
The junta was increasingly being seen in a much more favourable light, as it 
once more appeared to be a geostrategically important NATO stronghold. 
The affirmations of the colonels about their uncompromising allegiance 
to the Western Alliance were greeted in the West as a much-sought-after 
reassurance in the face of “communist danger”. Britain, in particular, wanting 
to assert its proximity to American views, could not assume the role of leader 
in a motion unpleasant to the regime in Athens. Therefore, even the idea of 
having Brosio discussing human rights issues with members of the junta was 
not painstakingly followed. As a result of that, and in conjunction with the 
result of the referendum on the Greek constitution, the colonels, bolstered by 
the greater emphasis being put on NATO military preparedness in the wake 
of the Czechoslovakian crisis, toughened their stance and, especially, their 
resistance to pressure from their allies on Greek internal matters. 
60 FCO 9/166 Letter from Hood to Sir Bernard Burrows, 18-12-1968.
61 LE/1969/5.1 part 1 no. 7153/ST/2 Verykios to MFA, 21-12-1968.
62 Ibid.
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1969
At the beginning of 1969, the British government was still trying to keep 
the ambiguous attitude that it had assumed vis-à-vis the Greek junta from 
the beginning of establishing relations.63 Consequently, in the light of the 
discussion in the CoE concerning Greece, which was stimulated by a joint 
motion by delegates from the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands, 
Britain decided neither to take the lead in Greece’s suspension nor to oppose 
it. The British ambassador, Sir Michael Stewart, implied that this decision 
“might be unheroic but it was correct in the circumstances”.64 The state of 
Anglo-Greek relations at the time, especially at such an important junction as 
the formulation of a “make or break” decision in London concerning the CoE, 
was really precarious and it illustrated the divisions and the power struggles 
within both governments, as far as the thorny issue of relations between the 
two old allies was concerned. 
Panayotis Pipinellis, an extremely experienced and capable diplomat and 
politician, spent most of his days as Greek foreign minister swerving round the 
inconsistencies and the anti-Western rhetoric of the Athens military regime, 
and trying to mollify Greece’s most significant allies by promising constitutional 
and other policy reforms that most of the time were unacceptable in the eyes of 
the colonels who were then at the helm of Greece. In this particular instance, 
Pipinellis, in a private talk he had with the British ambassador, indirectly 
asked that Whitehall should use its “good offices to help to secure a neutral 
recommendation from the Assembly”, so that the Greek delegation would not 
walk out and “ipso facto shut the door on any further enquiry into the torture 
allegations” that the sub-committee of the Commission of Human Rights was 
going to examine in a visit to Greece in February.65 Stewart seemed to have been 
of the same mind as his Greek counterpart and so went on to suggest to FCO 
ministers to inform the members of the British delegation on the advantages 
of a milder course of action.66
Moreover, Lord Chalfont, British minister responsible for Greek affairs, 
rejected reports that his country was against suspension because a large arms 
deal was being negotiated at the time and stressed that British delegates 
were “entirely free to vote according to their consciences”.67 The Greek 
63 Woodhouse, The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels, p. 69.
64 FCO 9/871 Record of a meeting on Greece by N. J. Barrington, 17-2-1969. 
65 FCO 9/845 Letter by Sir Michael Stewart in Athens to Edmonds at FCO, 21-1-1969.
66 Ibid.
67 “Verdict on Greece”, The Guardian (27 January 1969).
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Embassy, however, immediately agreed with The Times that Britain “would 
in fact oppose any such recommendation, largely because of the importance 
of Greece as a member of NATO’s eastern flank”, with Verykios writing to 
Athens that his personal impression was that Whitehall would do “anything 
possible, without, though, exposing itself completely, to undermine any such 
move”.68 Most delegates disassociated the Greek regime’s moral standing, as 
it was demonstrated in its human rights record, from the security it provided 
within the NATO framework and emphasized their decision by noting that 
none of the other European dictatorships (that is, Spain and Portugal) was 
a member of the Council.69 However, the British realized that, if there was 
a strong movement for suspension among other governments, it would 
be difficult for them to oppose it, also in view of parliamentary pressure. 
Therefore, on 28 November 1969, the British ambassador called on the Greek 
foreign minister to say that Whitehall believed that the best solution would 
be for the Greeks to withdraw from the CoE.70 
The above issue caused trouble for British officials for a considerable 
amount of time, as it was linked both to the colonels’ threat to leave NATO as a 
consequence of Greece’s expulsion from the CoE and to Britain’s commercial 
interests. Chancellor of the Exchequer Roy Jenkins took the line that Britain 
“should not suffer economically purely in order to take a resolute, moral 
stand”,71 a position vindicated by the foreign secretary, although the amount 
of trade at stake with Greece was then not very large.72 Wilson’s decision to 
“sacrifice” Greece’s presence in a political organization of lesser significance 
was designed to function as a “safety valve” for the automatic release of 
parliamentary and public opinion pressure when the temperature on the 
Greek case exceeded the limits.73
Correspondence between FCO officials and the British Embassy in Athens, as 
well as documents circulating in Whitehall, suggest that the British government’s 
main objective was to maintain good working relations with the colonels, 
in order to influence them regarding, first and foremost, Britain’s national 
interests, but also, admittedly to a lesser extent, with respect to Greece’s return 
to constitutional rule. A number of meetings between the Greek ambassador 
68 LE/1969/5.1 part 3 no. 521/ST/Z Verykios to MFA, 26-1-1969.
69 “Strasbourg Vote for Greece’s Suspension”, The Guardian (31 January 1969).
70 FCO 9/1192 “Annual review for 1969”, Sir Michael Stewart, 20-1-1970.
71 FCO 9/885 Record of a meeting on Greece, Barrington, 17-2-1969.
72 British exports were valued at £33.2 million a year in 1967 and £39.9 million in 1968 
(FCO 9/892 Letter from G. A. Barry to J. M. O. Snodgrass, CRE 27683/G, 2-10-1969).
73 On this issue, see Pesmazoglu, “Ελληνική δικτατορία και ΕΟΚ”, p. 105.
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Fig. 1. Britain’s four main objectives vis-à-vis Greece, 
laid down by Foreign Secretary Sir Michael Stewart. 
The memorandum became the most seminal and oft-quoted document on Greece 
within the Foreign Office during the junta's reign.
Source: The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Foreign and Commonwealth Office files, 
9/870 OPD (69)3 Memorandum, 24-1-1969.
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and FCO ministers illustrate this point clearly. In the long meeting between the 
Greek representative and Stewart, the latter took advantage of the occasion to 
express his dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in Greece. He said it was very 
difficult for British public opinion and parliament to forgive the suspension of 
democratic rule in the Mediterranean country, and, that, consequently, that 
had to be Whitehall’s view, as well. Moving on to the CoE question, Stewart 
made clear that London had not been actively involved yet and added that the 
junta’s arguments and timetable were not cogent; the only persuasive point, 
which could block Greece’s expulsion, would be the announcement of an 
election date. The foreign secretary said that since the Greek government had 
decided to fight in the CoE, Britain’s position was extremely difficult. After the 
spring summit there was no more time to be bought and the walls were closing 
in, as even larger countries, like Britain or France (over Suez) and the US (over 
Vietnam), had to take into consideration public opinion and advice or pressure 
from other friends or allies.74 It should be noted here that Stewart spoke on the 
same lines with the US under-secretary, warning him that “if no action were 
taken against Greece in December opinion in the UK would feel more outraged 
at the colonels and that this would have a damaging effect on NATO”.75
The new Greek ambassador to London, Ioannis A. Sorokos, responded 
by saying that the junta expected London’s understanding and real and 
responsible support, as “the theory of democracy is easy; what is difficult is 
its real implementation”. On the CoE, he said that Greece could not believe 
that a responsible British government would subscribe to such frivolous 
thoughts. “On the contrary,” he added, “we expect [Britain] to pursue a 
responsible policy and to influence other countries as well to take into 
account European unity and the goodwill of Greek people.’” The junta was 
not going to schedule elections because “it could not succumb to pressure 
even from its closer friends, and, primarily, because it needed to prepare the 
country for true democracy”. The ambassador’s report on the meeting closed 
with him informing Athens about Stewart’s “complete disagreement” with 
the Greek government and his intention to concur in Greece’s expulsion.76 
By the end of the year, the wave of dissatisfaction created in most European 
capitals by the regime’s repellent treatment of the population reached 
prodigious dimensions, as, at the end of November, a secret report compiled by 
the Commission of Human Rights that condemned the colonels’ “disregard for 
74 LE/1970/4.4 no. 6532/ST/2 I. A. Sorokos, London to MFA, 18-10-1969.
75 National Archives, Washington, DC [hereafter NARA], RG 59: POL 23-9 Elliot L. 
Richardson, London, to Rogers, D.C., tel. no. 9187, 8-11-1969.
76 LE/1970/4.4 no. 6532/ST/2 Sorokos to MFA, 18-10-1969.
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the rule of law and its practice of torture and imprisonment without trial” was 
leaked to the press.77 That fact, in conjunction with America’s unwillingness 
to press the British over Greece, resulted in Wilson’s announcement, on 9 
December, that his government would vote for expulsion: 
I informed the House that in default of a sudden change of heart by 
the Greek Government, expressed in a short and specific time-table 
relating to the restoration both of democracy and human rights, Her 
Majesty’s Government’s representative had been instructed to vote 
for the suspension of Greece from membership of the Council.78
The British government’s vote for the expulsion of Greece from the CoE 
steered Anglo-Greek relations once more towards an impasse. The only 
politicians to escape the wrath of the junta were the Conservatives, and 
especially Sir Alec Douglas-Home, who had made a speech in the House of 
Commons on Greek membership of the CoE. In a letter to the British MP, 
Sorokos expressed his “deep satisfaction in realising, once more, that in your 
person we Greeks can find tangible proof of responsible comprehension in 
facing such a serious issue as is the actual Greek case”. He went on as follows: 
“It is so gratifying to feel, at present, that there are still leading political 
personalities in your great nation who continue to appreciate the mutual 
advantage deriving from the maintenance of friendly relations between our 
two countries.”79 
1970
1970 was to be quite different in many respects that again had to do with 
international developments, but, more importantly, with the situation in 
the interior of the two countries. The Greek colonels had managed to wrap 
themselves in the veil of a rather extensive political aloofness from the rest 
of Europe. The junta’s decision to withdraw from the Council of Europe in 
December 1969, in light of its imminent suspension, shut it off from most 
Scandinavian and Benelux countries, while some other Western European 
countries were forced to re-evaluate their policies towards Greece, albeit to 
a certain degree. In 1970, Britain’s diplomatic efforts were concentrated on 
limiting and repairing the damage to the Anglo-Greek connection caused at 
Strasbourg. London was again striving to adopt a twofold policy (not appear 
77 C. M. Woodhouse, Modern Greece: A Short History, London: Faber & Faber, 2000, p. 69.
78 H. Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964-70: A Personal Record, London: Weidenfeld 
& Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1971, p. 918.
79 LE/1969/4.3 Letter from Sorokos to Douglas-Home, no. 2983, 10-12-1969.
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to let the junta off too lightly and minimize a further regression of bilateral 
relations), thus following what a future British ambassador would (in 1973) 
call a “hot and cold policy”:
What I chiefly want to avoid is that we should drift […] into a position 
where we are trying to combine being ostentatiously beastly to the 
Colonels in public with attempting to make drafts on their goodwill in 
private. The last Government tried this policy. It didn’t work for them, 
and it wouldn’t work for this one either.80 
The change in Whitehall to which the ambassador was referring occurred in 
June 1970, when the Wilson government’s life ended, giving way to a Conservative 
restoration, which was expected also to affect Anglo-Greek relations. Domestic 
developments in both countries and the change in leadership these entailed, 
in conjunction with the alterations in the international and regional scenes, 
brought about the feeling that things were about to become different in many 
respects: “In the first place there was a new British government, in the second 
there had been Government changes of some significance in Greece,” as the 
Greek foreign minister was reported saying to the British ambassador.81 The 
unexpected defeat of Labour had as a consequence the arrival of new (and 
some not so new) people at the helm of British foreign policy; namely Edward 
Heath, the new PM, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, once again as foreign secretary 
(the previous time being in the early 1960s), and, to a certain extent, Lord 
Carrington, the new Secretary of Defence. Douglas-Home was a very well-
respected figure, and his qualities were acknowledged by Heath, resulting in 
a good working relationship between the two of them;82 that is quite unlike 
the one between Wilson and Brown mainly in 1967-1968, a period of crisis in 
Anglo-Greek relations. As a direct consequence, the British government was 
in a better position to deal with international issues, such as relations with the 
Greek colonels’ regime. Nevertheless, this did not mean that London was bound 
to provide stronger resistance to the colonels or push them more vehemently 
towards restoring democracy in Greece, as Douglas-Home’s conservative 
credentials were known and universally proven in more than one instance. 
80 FCO 9/1714 Hooper to Goodison, 21-6-1973.
81 FCO 9/1193 Letter from Sir Michael Stewart, Athens, to Secondé, FCO, 7-7-1970. On 
the Greek government reshuffle, see “Specialists Added to Athens Cabinet”, The New York 
Times (29 June 1970).
82 A. Shlaim, P. Jones and K. Sainsbury, British Foreign Secretaries since 1945, London: 
David and Charles, 1977, pp. 152-155.
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The election outcome caused high expectations in the Greek capital, 
as the colonels were expecting the new government to be more friendly, 
accommodating and cooperative than the Labour government, chiefly 
because of its nature and political orientation,83 but also because of the 
emphasis it had chosen to put on NATO in its electoral manifesto. The Greek 
press comments on the elections are quite telling; note especially the leading 
article in the pro-government Νέα Πολιτεία that claimed that the British 
election results “show[ed] that the swing towards the left in Europe is being 
halted” and that these developments “vindicate[d] the 1967 Revolution 
[sic] and show[ed] that the Greek officers who launched it were the first to 
understand the message of [the] times”.84
More importantly, though, the same newspaper, in a different article in 
the same edition, examined the attitude of leading Conservative politicians 
towards the Greece of the colonels before the election and commented that 
“the Conservatives had shown an impeccable attitude and had faced the Greek 
Revolution with objective understanding” [emphasis added]. The author of 
the article went so far as to state that Heath, as leader of the opposition, had, 
in private talks with Greek officials, “repeatedly offered to help smooth over 
misunderstandings, had expressed his understanding of the Greek problem and 
had accepted it as sui generis”. Finally, less vocal opposition among governmental 
circles was considered more likely: as David Bendall, a British official, told 
Sorokos, although the new government was not thinking of making “dramatic 
decisions” on Anglo-Greek relations, the fact that there was no left wing to create 
problems (as with Labour) could be seen as “an auspicious point”.85 
A severe blow, nevertheless, on the attempt to establish a better understanding 
between London and Athens came in the form of the death of Pipinellis (a 
seasoned diplomat and experienced politician who was particularly liked by the 
British), in July. Pipinellis was succeeded by Georgios Papadopoulos himself, 
which resulted in an automatic further accumulation of powers by the former 
colonel (he had relinquished his military title by then), who was already prime 
minister and minister of defence. This was not viewed in the most favourable 
light by the hardliners of the junta, and an internal crisis ensued during the 
“hot summer” of 1970.86 The person who was chosen by Papadopoulos to assist 
83 The Greek foreign minister made “no attempt to conceal his pleasure at the election 
results in England” when he met Sir Michael Stewart (FCO 9/1193 Letter, Stewart to Secondé, 
7-7-1970). 
84 “Κύριο άρθρο” [Editorial], Νέα Πολιτεία (21 June 1970).
85 LE/1970/3.4 part 1/2 no. 3361/ST/20 Sorokos to MFA, 17-7-1970.
86 See, for example, Carl Barkman, Ambassador in Athens, London: Merlin Press, 1989, 
pp. 32-34 and 43.
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him in the conduct of foreign policy was Christos Xanthopoulos-Palamas, who 
was given the title under-secretary for foreign affairs. Xanthopoulos-Palamas, 
according to what Spyros Markezinis told the British, and with which Sir 
Michael Stewart concurred, “though able was totally amoral […and] would 
try to quit at the first moment of serious trouble, but would in the meantime 
intrigue to strengthen and improve his position with Papadopoulos”.87 
This was the situation in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
September 1970 when the Eastern Mediterranean area turned, once again, 
into a “powder keg”. Events in Jordan, Egypt and Turkey contributed to a 
substantial change in Greece’s relations with the superpowers. The British 
were, once again, quick to affirm that “the South-East flank of NATO, where 
Greece occupies such a strategic position, is an area where we cannot afford 
any dislocation of the Alliance” and that “we should try to keep the Greek 
Government’s relations with NATO correct and good”.88 As it were, the 
regional context presented the colonels with a serious advantage, and they 
moved sharply to exploit it in their relations with other countries. Sorokos 
answered Sir Thomas Brimelow’s concern over the very complicated and 
extremely dangerous situation in the Middle East by confirming the stability 
of Greece’s foreign policy and asserting its significance as a peace factor in 
the Balkan and Eastern Mediterranean areas.89 On the British side, Stewart 
was one of the first to state that “at a time of increasing tension in the Middle 
East and of growing Soviet naval strength in the Mediterranean, [Greece’s] 
importance will […] be thought to have increased”.90 
When the issue of the new ambassador to Athens was brought up 
in an FCO meeting, it was decided that the new British representative 
should deliver to Papadopoulos a message that would: “[…] lay emphasis 
on the importance [the British] attach[ed] to Greece’s membership of the 
Western Alliance, [their] anxiety to establish a good working relationship 
with the Greek Government and [their] determination to continue [their] 
support of the Greek Government’s efforts to promote a lasting settlement 
in Cyprus”. These three points would become the major objectives of UK 
policy towards Greece in the early 1970s, and action taken by the FCO would 
be measured against these basic aims. Quite importantly, the record states 
that “the difficulties created in Britain by the Greek Government’s continued 
87 FCO 9/1193 Powell-Jones to Snodgrass, 14-8-1970.
88 FCO 9/1206 “Greece and NATO”, in Secretary of State’s talks with the Italians, 2-9-70.
89 LE/1970/4.4 no. 4417/ST/2 Sorokos to MFA, 23-9-1970.
90 FCO 9/1229 “Greece as a military ally” diplomatic report no. 441/70 by Sir Michael 
Stewart, 11-9-1970.
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suspension of certain articles of the new Constitution might also be mentioned 
but should not be over-emphasised ” [emphasis added].91
On the issue of arms sales to Greece, Sir Denis Greenhill (permanent 
under-secretary of state for foreign affairs) said that his country wished to do 
“as much business as possible with Greece”. He added that “this could include 
the sale of arms and equipment that would enable Greece to carry out its 
NATO role” and he made specific reference to supplying ships for the Greek 
navy.92 The Greeks viewed this quite positively, for the additional reason that 
Athens was under the impression that London was not willing to sell it tanks, 
as was illustrated a few months before.93 According to the British ambassador, 
Whitehall had rejected proposals then because the political climate had not 
been suitable, while now there was a change and a willingness to cooperate on 
the issue of arms sales.94
One of the top items on the agenda was Cyprus, as “Palamas appeared 
quite eager that [the British] do something about [it]”, to which he received 
a “duly qualified response”.95 In view of the situation on the island, that is 
with Archbishop Makarios following a constructive approach and the Turks’ 
attitude changing for the worse (including pressure for a federal solution), 
according to Xanthopoulos-Palamas, the Greek official wondered whether 
the British “did not see it as in their interests to lend a hand in bringing matters 
to a successful solution”.96 Bendall, one of the British officials present at this 
exchange, interpreted that as an effort to get Britain to “lean on the Turks 
to make concessions”.97 He and Greenhill replied that London “had always 
thought it best to stand aside from the dispute” and that Britain would only 
contribute to a solution “if all the parties concerned wanted [its] help and 
advice”, as it “did not intend in any way to impose [itself]”.98 Xanthopoulos-
91 FCO 9/1206 Notes on FCO meeting entitled “Policy towards Greece”, 30-9-1970.
92 FCO 9/1233 Record of conversation between the permanent under-secretary and the 
Greek under-secretary for foreign affairs, 7-10-1970.
93 LE/1972/4.1 no. 4700/ST/2 Sorokos to Armed Forces headquarters, Athens, 9-10-1970, 
and Sorokos to N. Broumas, Athens, 5-10-1970.
94 LE/1972/4.1 Sorokos to Broumas, Athens, 5-10-1970.
95 FCO 9/1233 Bendall, London, to Stewart, Athens, 9-10-1970. On how Xanthopoulos-
Palamas’ approach to Cyprus differed from that of Pipinellis, see Rizas, Οι Ηνωμένες Πολι-
τείες, pp. 88-90.
96 FCO 9/1233 Record of conversation between the permanent under-secretary and the 
Greek under-secretary for foreign affairs, 7-10-1970.
97 FCO 9/1233 Bendall to Stewart, 9-10-1970.
98 FCO 9/1233 Record of conversation between the permanent under-secretary and the 
Greek under-secretary for foreign affairs, 7-10-1970.
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Palamas insisted by arguing that what was required was a “pragmatic approach 
to the problem, of the sort with which the name of Britain was associated” 
[emphasis added] and that he thought that Archbishop Makarios would then 
be more prepared for Whitehall to be involved. Greenhill’s reaction was to 
say that “in the right circumstances, [the British government] would look 
carefully at a request for help”. The background notes shed some light on 
what this statement could have meant: 
The Greek Government have previously mentioned that an initiative 
by us might be welcome if and when the talks reach an impasse. At 
that stage, a proposal by us for the appointment of a “moderator” to 
assist the parties in the talks might be well taken. But we would only 
wish to take such action if all sides wanted us to. Meanwhile, the idea 
is better kept to ourselves and in reserve. [emphasis added]99
1971-1972
1971 marked the continuation of gradual British efforts to persuade Greeks 
in positions of responsibility to develop a better relationship with London 
after the tensions of 1967 and 1970. The most important events in that respect 
were the meeting between the Lord President of the Council, William 
Whitelaw, and Pattakos and the visits of Xanthopoulos-Palamas and General 
Odysseus Anghelis to London. The new British ambassador to Athens, Sir 
Robin Hooper, thought that the visits served as “a positive indication of 
goodwill” on Britain’s part, and that the last two events were “something of a 
landmark in the process”.100 This period was also dominated by British fears 
of a takeover by young extremist officers (often collectively referred to as 
“Nasserites”) and their belief that, in the event of Papadopoulos falling from 
power, the most possible solution to the deadlock of dictatorship in Greece 
would be the Nasserites’ taking control. 
Pattakos, deputy prime minister and minister of the interior at the time, 
lunched at the embassy on 3 June to meet the Lord President of the Council. 
Pattakos was confined in saying only that the main difference between the 
junta and the previous governments was that he and his colleagues “regarded 
the interests of the Greek people as paramount, and were not the tools of 
foreign powers or outside interests”. The true intentions of the ex-brigadier 
were more acutely revealed when he was asked when elections would be 
held in Greece; he answered that “he did not think the Greek people wanted 
99 Ibid.
100 FCO 9/1514 “Annual review for 1971”, 31-12-1971.
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elections” at the time, as he was convinced from his provincial tours that his 
government enjoyed “substantial popular support”. He went on to stress that 
“the continuing communist threat was an important factor”, but he added 
that he and his colleagues had no wish to stay in power indefinitely and 
had a plan for their eventual withdrawal. As regards Anglo-Greek relations, 
Pattakos, who described himself as an Anglophile, brought up the Cyprus 
Question and that gave Whitelaw the opportunity to “express appreciation of 
the present policy of the Greek Government over Cyprus, and their efforts to 
reach an understanding with Turkey”. The Greek minister replied by assuring 
his interlocutor that “Greece would never be the first to use force” [emphasis 
added]. According to the record of the meeting, the conversation concluded 
with a suggestion by Pattakos that Greece’s allies would have more effect on 
the Greek situation “by persuasion than coercion” [emphasis added].101 
The Greek authorities were delighted with the meeting, but wondered 
why such meetings had to be treated as confidential. The colonels were aware 
of the British government’s wish to avoid controversy in parliament, but they 
also needed to show to the Greek public and the international community 
that were not treated like pariahs. As the Greek ambassador told Brimelow: 
“Athens would like contacts with this country [i.e. Britain] to be open.”102 
Pattakos, in particular, sent a letter to Whitelaw to thank the British for the 
pleasant atmosphere and the constructive dialogue, but also to warn them of 
the adverse effect actions by UK-based resistance organizations would have 
on Anglo-Greek relations:
We are aware that innate weaknesses of the British political system 
afford opportunities on British territory for impermissible attacks on 
Greece. But we hope that your Government will in future see its interest 
in preventing such attacks as far as possible, since despite all the Greek 
Government’s efforts they have an unfavourable effect on our people’s 
attitude towards Britain. [emphasis added]103 
At that time relations between London and Athens were considered 
“satisfactory” by the British.104 Exchanges and meetings between officials of 
the two governments had been intensified. One meeting between the Greek 
ambassador in London and Lord Carrington provided the occasion for 
a reiteration of the Conservatives’ policy towards the Greek colonels. The 
101 FCO 9/1385 Hooper, Athens, to FCO, tel. no. 216, 4-6-1971.
102 FCO 9/1401 Brimelow to Hooper, 13-8-1971.
103 FCO 9/1415 Letter from S. Pattakos to Lord President of the Council, 10-6-1971.
104 FCO 9/1415 “Policy towards Greece”, FCO memorandum, 11-6-1971.
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UK’s objectives towards Greece remained the same four that the Labour 
government had outlined in 1968; with one significant difference, though. 
The three objectives, namely b) the preservation of the military effectiveness 
of Greece as a NATO ally, c) the protection of British subjects and British 
interests generally, and in particular Britain’s commercial interests, and 
d) the preservation of the ability to influence the colonels in matters of 
foreign policy, and especially on Cyprus, were immutable. The objective 
mentioned first, however, that is, a) the promotion of the return to Greece 
of constitutional rule and full democratic liberties in conditions of stability, 
was, for the first time, qualified or rather downgraded. 
The most striking development, however, would have to do with arms 
sales to Greece. The FCO speaking notes are revealing of the new attitude of 
the Conservative government towards that sensitive issue:
The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has agreed that our policy 
on arms sales to Greece should be adjusted in the direction of a more 
positive effort to sell arms to Greece. The Greeks were aware of our 
previous policy, under which we were prepared to allow the sale to 
Greece of arms for NATO purposes. We now wish actively to promote 
such sales, although we must still be cautious about the supply to 
Greece of arms that could be used against the civilian population, 
or are associated with this e.g. tanks. Lord Carrington will not of 
course wish to mention this latter aspect of our policy, but could be 
encouraging about arms sales generally. [emphasis added]105
In Athens, Sorokos informed (member of the colonels’ triumvirate) Nikolaos 
Makarezos about concerted British efforts to attract deals and added that 
those proved the British were “ardently” pursuing arms sales to Greece. The 
ambassador’s suggestion was the following:
If and when the General Staff decides […] that such and such an 
item of British materiel is good for us, it should not, for God’s sake, 
tell anyone. It should be trusted to the government and given to the 
ministry of foreign affairs first, so that the ministry makes good use 
of it, politically and diplomatically. (No less than an unambiguous 
promise of a ministerial visit to Athens.)
The rationale behind this suggestion was that Sorokos thought that the 
British, perceiving the Greek intention, “would do anything possible both to 
secure the order through the salami method and to avoid giving a promise 
for a visit”.106 
105 Ibid.
106 LE/1972/4.1 Letter from Sorokos to Makarezos, 21-3-1972.
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The trigger that sparked the change of UK policy in relation to arms sales 
was economic in nature. The problematic state of the British economy and the 
urgent need for trade contracts to boost revenue was exerting its influence on 
the diplomatic field, which is traditionally vulnerable to this kind of pressure. 
In this particular instance the hard facts of reality became more obvious under 
the light of the power of competition: the failure of British firms to secure 
contracts in Greece, mainly attributed to the “Byzantine style of negotiations” 
of the Greeks and the primacy and advantage of the US over arms shipments 
to the country, was being extremely accentuated in the early 1970s. As far as 
Britain’s relations with the Greek armed forces were concerned, there was 
a considerable improvement, with the major factor being undoubtedly the 
decision to invite General Anghelis to visit London as the guest of the chief 
of the defence staff. The British were, nonetheless, not entirely satisfied solely 
with the cultivation of good inter-service relations. As Hooper wrote in his 
report: “naturally one would like to see it result in the purchase of British 
military equipment”.107 Much to the dismay, though, of both the British 
ambassador and the defence attaché, Brigadier Baxter, who was hoping that 
UK suppliers could help the Greeks solve their problem of under-equipment, 
the prospects of arms sales to Greece remained “uncertain”.108 
There was, however, a rise in UK trade with Greece109 as a result of two 
high-profile visits (one unofficial and one official) to Greece, this time: 
the first, by Lord Carrington, minister of defence, and the second by Lord 
Limerick, parliamentary under-secretary of state for trade and industry. The 
visits were instigated by Hooper, who thought that his country should do 
more in terms of increasing its influence on the government in Greece and 
expanding trade prospects and defence cooperation. The British ambassador 
to Athens was, though, instrumental in another change to London’s policy 
towards Greece. The FCO decided that concerns about the protection of 
human rights and the democratic nature of the Greek polity would have to be 
replaced by pragmatic considerations which mostly had to do with security 
(NATO) and financial (trade) matters:
107 FCO 9/1530 Hooper to Douglas-Home, 2-3-1972.
108 Ibid.
109 UK exports to Greece had reached a record high in 1971 and remained strong in 1972, 
and imports from Greece were considerably higher than from 1966 to 1968, but that was not 
interpreted in a larger share of the market of the country which was led by the military regime 
of the colonels (FCO 9/1520 Supplementary briefs to “Visit by Lord Limerick to Greece”, A. 
Brooke Turner, London, to Brimelow, London, 12-10-1972).
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It had to be recognised that the retention at the top of the list of our policy 
objectives of the “promotion of the return to Greece of constitutional 
rule and democratic liberties in conditions of stability” had become 
inappropriate […] We should beware of projects which could prove 
counter-productive by attracting damaging criticism […] Our objectives, 
and any change in them, are not made public in these terms. We should 
still make clear in Parliament our hope that democracy would soon be 
restored in Greece. […] We should continue to resist attempts by the 
Danes and Norwegians for action against Greece in NATO, and try to 
dissuade other NATO Governments from joining the Scandinavians’ 
campaign.110 
Whitehall, therefore, opted for a more pro-active stance regarding Greece’s 
position in the Atlantic Alliance, offering its assistance to the colonels’ 
cause.111 The new British policy was exemplified by the defence secretary’s 
“semi-official” visit to Greece in 1972. Lord Carrington’s talks with the Greek 
leaders enabled him to express recognition of Greece’s contribution to NATO 
and to make clear to Papadopoulos and Pattakos his government’s desire for 
good working relations.112 According to the Dutch ambassador, this British 
move showed that the Conservatives were willing to go “a little further”, as 
economic considerations had “no doubt played a role”.113 Responding to 
reactions to his visit to Athens, Lord Carrington epitomized British foreign 
policy under the Conservatives towards Greece as follows:
It never seemed to me to be necessary that you should approve of 
the politics or the manner of a régime in order that you should have 
ordinary relations…So this doesn’t seem to me to be really a very 
exceptional circumstance. I also – and my country – happen to think 
that Greece is a very important part of NATO – and what happens in 
the South East of Europe and the survival of Greece and of Turkey is 
a matter of enormous substance to NATO, and therefore as Greece is 
a member of the NATO Alliance and so are we, we must be friends. 
[emphasis added]114 
110 FCO 9/1728 “Greece”, Record of office meeting in parliamentary under-secretary’s 
office, 11-2-1972.
111 Ibid.
112 FCO 9/1533 Powell-Jones to Douglas-Home, 13-9-1972.
113 Barkman, Ambassador in Athens, p. 85.
114 FCO 9/1533 Text of Lord Carrington’s interview with the BBC, 16-10-1972.
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1973
During this seminal year, a restructuring of policy towards the Greek 
regime was decided upon, although expectations did not change before the 
liberalizing measures taken by the Greek premier in the summer and the 
formation of the short-lived Markezinis government in the autumn. The 
naval mutiny, the subsequent abolition of the monarchy and the referendum 
all meant that London’s dilemma of either promoting closer relations with the 
military regime with the risk of parliamentary criticism, or giving the colonels 
the cold shoulder and thus putting trade prospects in danger, now became 
more pronounced. Furthermore, 1973 was the year that Britain became a 
member of the European Economic Community. The colonels thought that 
it was thus an opportune time to once again try to twist Britain’s hand over 
the EEC and other commercial matters. In this context, members of the junta, 
such as Makarezos, had earlier informed Western ambassadors that “the road 
to the ministry of National Economy ran through the ministry of Foreign 
Affairs”.115 It was then agreed that it was “presentationally important” for 
London to help the colonels in Brussels and make clear to them that their 
troubles there were not of Britain’s making. As part of this suggested quid 
pro quo, the British thought that, while remaining careful not to give empty 
promises, “it should nonetheless be possible to extract some advantage from 
such help as we might be able to give”.116 More specifically, Hooper suggested 
a “helpful and sympathetic attitude” towards the Greeks and their problems, 
believing that this would safeguard British interests, including prospects of 
obtaining public sector contracts, and would “ensure that [Britain’s] principal 
competitors (the French and Germans) do not have the advantage”. He 
clarified his point further, leaving little doubt about Britain’s policy on this 
sensitive subject: “[…] we should take full credit and extract what return we 
can whenever we speak up for the Greeks. We can support them on such 
matters as may arise within the Community affecting their interests but not 
impinging on important interests of other member states”.117
A particularly important event of 1973 was the abortive naval coup, 
which was received in the British capital as “an amateurish and clumsy 
operation”, involving only a small number of people, and being dealt with 
promptly and efficiently by the security services of the junta.118 Apart from 
115 FCO 9/1731 Brooke Turner to Wiggin, 3-1-1973.
116 FCO 9/1732 Record of meeting on Greece, 4-4-1973.
117 FCO 9/1732 Hooper’s comments attached to Goodison to Logan, 30-3-1973.
118 FCO 286/1456 Hooper to FCO, tel. no. 164, 24-5-1973.
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its seminal repercussions within Greece, the attempted naval mutiny and the 
Velos incident were of considerable importance for London’s relations with 
Athens, inasmuch as they were to be followed by a large British naval visit 
on 2 June. The upcoming visit was destined to expose Whitehall to criticism 
“from the usual quarters in London”, who would argue that the traditional 
justification for maintaining a working relationship with the colonels (that is, 
Greece’s efficiency and significance as a NATO member) no longer held good, 
as the reliability of the Greek navy would now be in doubt. Ambassador 
Hooper’s suggestion was to go ahead with the visit as planned (as would also 
the Americans) for the following reason: “Cancellation would be a public 
declaration of no confidence, which would be deeply resented here (not only 
in government circles) and might affect not merely Anglo-Greek relations 
but also Greek relations with NATO.”119
A New Era in Relations
The incidents of late May functioned as a cue for Papadopoulos to introduce 
new and unexpected political and constitutional developments that had 
been conceived some time before: the Greek monarchy was abolished 
and a presidential republic, with Papadopoulos as president, declared. A 
referendum on the constitutional issue was announced, and parliamentary 
elections were promised before the end of 1974,120 since, according to 
Hooper, “an important motive in Papadopoulos’ liberalisation strategy was 
to gain acceptance in Western Europe and a thaw in the implementation 
of the Association Agreement”.121 All these announcements took place on 1 
June 1973, a date that marked the starting-point of a new era in Anglo-Greek 
relations. During this period (which lasted until November), the British 
were fairly satisfied by political developments, including the assumption of 
the premiership by Markezinis, as well as the emphasis he chose to put on 
relations with the EEC, and Britain in particular. Furthermore, actions by 
the opposition regarding the regime and pressure by public opinion and 
the press in London were subdued. In light of new developments, Hooper 
advocated that British commercial interests and common concern over 
Cyprus (although London’s position towards both was limited due to the 
United States’ predominance) dictated a course of continuation of the 
119 FCO 286/1456 Hooper to FCO, tel. no. 173, 29-5-1973.
120 FCO 9/1732 “Abolition of the Greek monarchy”, Hooper to Douglas-Home, 14-6-1973.
121 FCO 9/1998 “Annual review for 1973” diplomatic report no. 56/74, Hooper to Douglas-
Home, 7-1-1974.
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working relationship. Moreover, on the important issue of recognition, FCO 
official Alan Goodison said that Britain should use to its benefit the general 
impression given by the haste with which London acted (especially since 
Britain had recognized the republic deliberately on the day before the NATO 
foreign ministers’ meeting in Copenhagen): “It is generally understood that 
HMG were the first government formally to recognise the Greek Republic 
and, although this may be inaccurate seen under the magnifying glass of 
international lawyers, I see no reason why you should not make some play 
with the point if necessary.”122
The changes promoted by Papadopoulos were seen rather positively by 
the British Embassy in Athens, whose officials noted that, “however devious 
his motives, he ha[d] moved further in the direction of liberalisation than 
observers had thought possible”. It was also suggested that Britain should 
promote its commercial and other interests by showing “qualified approval” 
of the formation of the new government.123 The same spirit prevailed in the 
FCO, as well. The first reaction of the officials who were preparing an office 
meeting on Greece at that moment was to recommend Douglas-Home to 
“make generally encouraging noises” to the Greeks.124 The most important 
development, nevertheless, had to do with British policy objectives towards 
Greece. The existing objectives would remain, but there would be a significant 
addition in the form of a specific objective; namely, “the need discreetly to 
encourage progress towards democracy” [emphasis added]. What functioned 
as a further catalyst for this were the changes in governmental faces in Greece; 
with such figures as Pattakos (who was not loved by the British) and Makarezos 
out of the picture, and the formation of a civilian political government by 
(Anglophile) Markezinis, things looked to be picking up for relations between 
London and Athens. Relations thus moved deeper into a new phase, which 
made the British feel “fairly satisfied” with the advent of a political figure they 
knew too well, and with the emphasis he placed from the start of his stint in 
power on Greece’s link with Europe, and especially Britain.125 
Markezinis was initially viewed by London as worthy of its support. The 
British, like the USA and like other European countries, concluded that the 
Markezinis venture was “deserving of sympathy as affording a somewhat 
better prospect of a return to a measure of democracy than any of the likely 
122 FCO 9/1714 Goodison to Hooper, 22-6-1973.
123 FCO 9/1732 Denson to Goodison, 6-9-1973.
124 FCO 9/1732 Hitch to Denson, 7-9-1973.
125 LE/1973/3.7, “Annual review for 1973”, 0445/1/AS90, Broumas to MFA, 14-1-1974.
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alternatives”.126 Whitehall, again after consultation with the embassies of 
other European countries, decided that it could “afford to be reasonably 
generous”; the upshot was the decision to send a “fairly encouraging” 
message to Markezinis from Heath.127 Markezinis himself was gratified by 
Heath’s message and appeared keen on playing “the Britain card”. On his 
first meeting with Sir Robin Hooper, he expressed his desire to bring the 
two countries as close together as possible. The new Greek prime minister, 
though, was also interested in extracting significant (both symbolic and 
substantial) benefits from a closer relationship with London. The ambassador 
got the impression that Markezinis was “extremely anxious to get some 
major manifestation” of British approval for his return and that the British 
would most likely be pressed hard on this. Markezinis’ genuine admiration 
for Britain was not put into question but, as Hooper wrote, “the intention to 
use us as a counterweight is clearly at the back of his mind, and we shall have 
to be careful not to let him play us off against the Americans”.128
The formation of the Markezinis government, though, sparked an 
internal FCO debate between Goodison (favouring a more encouraging 
and less cautious attitude towards Greece) and Hooper and his chancery 
(suggesting that Britain should stick firmly to the line that “the Greek 
government should be judged by its actions, not its promises”).129 Discussion 
of this issue, however, was halted by a wave of student disturbances which 
took Athens by storm, culminating in the events of the Athens Polytechnic 
uprising and the army intervention to quell it on 16-17 November. According 
to the British ambassador, the army’s methods were “hardly in accordance” 
with British methods of controlling civil disturbance, as “the lack of proper 
riot equipment – ascribable at least in part to the West’s refusal to supply 
the Colonels with the means of repression – may, ironically enough, have 
left the military with no alternative to cracking a nut with a steam hammer” 
[emphasis added].130 Douglas-Home said that the disturbances represented 
“a serious setback to the attempts that were being made to restore a greater 
126 FCO 9/1998 “Annual review for 1973” no. 56/74, Hooper to Douglas-Home, 7-1-1974.
127 FCO 9/1716 Douglas-Home to Athens, tel. no. 263, 9-10-1973. See also Spyros Markezinis’ 
account in his Σύγχρονη πολιτική ιστορία της Ελλάδος, III: 1952-1975 [Contemporary political 
history of Greece, III: 1952-1975], Athens 1994, p. 185.
128 FCO 9/1730 Hooper to Goodison, 16-10-1973.
129 FCO 9/1733 Goodison to Wiggin, 1-11-1973.
130 FCO 9/1717 “Praxicopematics: Or the fall of Papadopoulos” memorandum no. 516/73, 
Hooper to FCO, 6-12-1973.
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measure of democracy”, and he noted that there would no doubt be renewed 
criticism of the Greek regime on the part of some members of NATO.131
After the army had restored order, on 25 November, “a swift, bloodless, 
and highly efficient” military coup d’état took place.132 Papadopoulos was 
deposed, with General Phaedon Gizikis133 taking his place and Adamantios 
Androutsopoulos forming a government “of civilian mediocrities”. The 
British, however, did not fail to notice immediately that the man pulling 
the strings was none of the above. Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannidis (head of 
military police, to be known as “the invisible dictator”) was identified as 
the “somewhat shadowy figure” behind the new government.134 Despite the 
nature of the regime, Hooper pushed for an early decision to recognize it, 
by alluding, once again, to Greece’s significance to NATO: “[…] to delay 
recognition overlong might provoke a reaction in a government the external 
political orientation of which is still not clear”.135 Hooper was not alone in 
this: FCO officials referred to Britain’s first objective in its policy towards 
Greece to justify their opinion that there were grounds for early recognition 
and that it was “clearly desirable that [London] should recognise without 
unduly delaying”.136 These suggestions were accepted by the government, 
which, after discussion at a cabinet meeting on the same day, decided to 
extend recognition to the Ioannidis regime on 4 December 1973, despite the 
new government’s lack of democratic credentials, making this the second 
fastest act of recognition of changes of governments through coup d’états in 
the period of the late 1960s to early 1970s.137 
The “business as usual” policy followed by the Conservatives was much 
appreciated by the junta; Christoyannis, a counsellor in the Greek Embassy, 
remarked that the Heath government was “more aware” than some others of 
the need to avoid pronouncements that could be taken as interfering in the 
internal affairs of Greece. The same official, when reminded about the British 
hope for restoration of democracy in Greece, informed his interlocutor that 
he felt optimistic about that “in the long run (with gloomy and significant 
131 NA: CAB 128/53, CM (73).57th, 22 November 1973. On this see also “The Colonels 
Go Back to Square One”, The Times (19 November 1973).
132 “Military Coup in Greece Removes Papadopoulos”, The New York Times (26 November 
1973).
133 See his obituary in The New York Times (30 July 1999).
134 FCO 9/1998 “Annual review for 1973” no. 56/74, Hooper to FCO, 7-1-1974.
135 FCO 9/1717 Hooper to FCO, tel. no. 416, 27-11-1973.
136 FCO 9/1717 “Greece: Recognition” memorandum WSG 1/4 by Goodison, 29-11-1973.
137 NA: CAB 128/53, CM (73).59th, 4 December 1973.
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emphasis on the last phrase)”, leaving him in no doubt as to the political 
orientation of the new regime.138
1974
1974 marked a turning point in Anglo-Greek relations. The return of Harold 
Wilson to Downing Street, and especially his party’s stance towards Greece 
while in opposition in the early 1970s, meant that policy towards the military 
rulers in Athens would be considered in a different light. The most seminal 
event in that respect was not the general election of 28 February per se, but 
the decision, taken two weeks later, for the cancellation of British naval visits 
to Athens, a decision that “helped raise Britain’s prestige abroad”.139 British 
ministers decided that the informal visit by HMS Tiger and HMS Charybdis to 
Athens, which had been arranged under the previous government and was due 
to begin on 15 March, should not take place.140 The ambassador in Athens was 
instructed immediately to inform the Greek authorities of the decision and of 
his government’s concern over the political situation in the country, but also to 
avoid discussing Anglo-Greek relations further. He was only permitted to say, 
if necessary, that London expected to have a “variety of continuing business” to 
discuss with the Greeks, which they would hope to conduct “in a business-like 
way”.141 The Greek officials’ reaction was to say that their government would 
be “extremely resentful” both of the decision and of the manner in which it 
had been taken. It was also added that Anglo-Greek relations were bound to be 
severely affected and the possibility of a formal protest was not excluded, as “this 
was not the behaviour that Greece expected of an ally”.142 Other reactions on 
the Greek side varied from strong headlines in Athens dailies to the markedly 
more sober attitude of some government officials. Εστία made reference to the 
“disgraceful” British behaviour in Northern Ireland,143 and Ελεύθερος Κόσμος 
used fiery rhetoric to denounce the British decision, also referring to Wilson’s 
minority government.144 On the contrary, the Greek ambassador, Nikolaos 
138 FCO 9/1717 “Recognition”, Baker to Denson, 7-12-1973.
139 David Childs, Britain since 1945: A Political History, London: Routledge, 2001, p. 182.
140 FCO 9/2005 Callaghan to Athens, tel. no. 49, 13-3-1974, and NA: CAB128/54, CM (74).3rd, 
Conclusions, 14 March 1973. See also James Callaghan, Time and Chance, London: Collins, 
1987, p. 338.
141 FCO 9/2005 Callaghan to Athens, tel. no. 49, 13-3-1974. See also LE/1974/5.11, 4111.4/1/
AS62, Broumas to Athens, 14-3-1974.
142 FCO 9/2015 Hooper to FCO, tel. no. 58, 14-3-1974.
143 “Κύριο άρθρο” [Editorial], Εστία (18 March 1974).
144 Ελεύθερος Κόσμος (17 March 1974), cited in FCO 9/2015 Hooper to FCO, tel. no. 67, 
18-3-1974.
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Broumas, adopted a very restrained attitude, expressed full understanding of 
the reasons for cancelling the naval visit and even volunteered that he had said 
to his own government that they had overreacted.145
In the aftermath of the cancellation of the visit, the Wilson government 
seemed to be more determined to adopt a harder line towards the Greek 
military dictatorship.146 After careful consideration, British ministers reached 
the conclusion that they should change the status of Anglo-Greek relations, 
slightly altering the wording from a “good working relationship” to a “proper 
working relationship”. The official responsible for Greece at the FCO, 
though, was quick to palliate Greek fears immediately, saying that this was 
a positive statement and that it was certainly the British intention that such 
a working relationship should go forward. Moreover, Goodison palliated N. 
Diamantopoulos’ anxiety over Britain’s attitude vis-à-vis Greece at NATO by 
claiming that relations would remain mostly unaffected, the only substantial 
change being in terms of appearances.147 
IV. Demise
This was the state of relations between Athens and London in the summer 
of 1974, immediately before the fall of the junta, which was largely caused 
by its adventurism in Cyprus. As a consequence of actions prompted by the 
regime in Athens, the whole of British (and international) attention was 
shifted eastwards to the island of Cyprus, where the Wilson government was 
faced with “a serious crisis”.148 The first reports about outbreaks of fighting 
in Nicosia reached London on 15 July.149 According to information gained 
during the first hours, it was looking “increasingly like a coup organised by 
Greek contingent/Greek-officered elements of National Guard”.150 Back in the 
British capital, the reaction was immediate. A parliamentary question on the 
situation on the island and possible action by Britain gave James Callaghan, 
the foreign secretary, the opportunity to make an extensive statement on the 
subject. He gave information to the House of Commons about the events and 
referred to the action he had taken, namely that he had drawn the attention 
145 FCO 9/2015 Goodison to Hooper, 13-4-1974, and Killick to Goodison, 21-4-1974.
146 G. Helmis, Ταραγμένη διετία, 1973-1974 [The Troubled Two-year Period, 1973-1974], 
Athens 2006, p. 140.
147 FCO 9/2015 “Anglo/Greek relations”, Goodison to Hooper, 22-4-1974.
148 H. Wilson, Final Term: The Labour Government, 1974-1976, London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1979, p. 61.
149 FCO 9/1890 Olver to FCO, tel. no. 178, 15-7-1974. 
150 Ibid., tel. no. 180, 15-7-1974.
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of the Greek and Turkish governments to the recognition and maintenance 
of independence, as well as the territorial integrity and security of Cyprus. 
Callaghan also said that he had urged the need for restraint on all sides and 
had asked for their urgent views on the situation.151 Sir Alec Douglas-Home 
joined the foreign secretary in the “utter condemnation” of the “brutal 
and senseless” alleged assassination of Makarios and expressed his hope 
that Athens and Ankara would jointly take action to calm “an explosive 
situation”. Callaghan replied that this was “a potentially explosive situation” 
that required “very great statesmanship and restraint” by both communities 
on the island in order to avoid even worse trouble. 
The Turkish invasion of Cyprus on 20 July served as the final catalyst for 
the events set in motion by the coup against Makarios, inasmuch as it spelled 
disaster for the objectives of the Greek junta regarding the island, and it 
marked the end of the “anachronistic”152 military dictatorship in Greece. Only 
a couple of days later, while the British were preoccupied with the Geneva 
Conference on Cyprus, reports reached London that the junta was about to 
fall and that Gizikis had summoned “old” politicians to discuss the formation 
of a civilian government.153 All in all, Greece’s exit from “seven years in a 
military strait-jacket”154 was “warmly welcome”, with FCO officials admitting 
that the country had emerged from the dictatorship “in better shape” than they 
had expected. By the end of 1974, British interests were thought aligned with 
supporting the Karamanlis government, which was as “sensible, moderate 
and pro-Western” as any they could expect to see in Greece.155 
V. Conclusion
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, British governments were in a very weak 
position both financially and internationally and, therefore, had to follow 
pragmatic policies that were meant to prove Britain’s subordination to NATO 
and American interests. The Wilson government, after an initial numbness, 
went out of its way to establish a “good working relationship” with the Greek 
151 London Press Service, Verbatim Service 132/74, 15 July 1974.
152 Sotiris Rizas, Η ελληνική πολιτική μετά τον Εμφύλιο Πόλεμο [Greek politics after 
the Civil War], Athens: Kastaniotis, 2008, p. 44.
153 FCO 9/2003 Hooper to FCO, tel. no. 289, 23-7-1974. For valuable behind-the-scenes 
information about these crucial discussions, see Stavros P. Psycharis, Τα παρασκήνια της 
αλλαγής. Ιούλιος 1974 [Behind the scenes of the change: July 1974], Athens 2013 [1974].
154 FCO 9/2014 “The results of the Greek election”, Brooks Richards, Athens to Callaghan, 
27-11-1974. 
155 FCO 9/2014 Goodison, FCO to Brooks Richards, 4-12-1974. 
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dictatorship that would permit the former to continue working with the 
government in Athens, and to make sure that the latter would continue to fulfil 
its NATO obligations, as a bastion of stability in the sensitive area of the Eastern 
Mediterranean. The colonels, in turn, were very quick to take advantage of 
Greece’s increased geostrategic importance in the general context of the Cold 
War and to exploit their dealings with Western allies for reasons of legitimacy 
and domestic consumption. The picture of ambiguity of Labour’s policy is 
completed by the differences between its rhetoric and actions, as, for example, 
providing Greece with arms and condoning it within NATO, while at the same 
time Labour ministers openly criticized the junta’s methods and urged it 
towards a “return to constitutional rule” in fora such as the Council of Europe. 
Wilson, as much as he disliked them, did not sever relations with the colonels; 
he recognized them and kept trading with them, thus promoting a policy of 
“business as usual”, but stopping short of unapologetically conducting warm 
relations with them and fulfilling all their demands (keeping contacts, including 
visits, to a minimum, for example). It was only after Labour returned to power 
following four years in opposition that Wilson appeared more adamant vis-à-
vis the (new form of the) dictatorship, in an effort to illustrate the point that his 
policy was different from that of his predecessor and to make good on Labour’s 
pre-election promises.
The Conservatives, on the other hand, due to their political orientation and 
the absence of a left wing, appeared “more realistic” to the Greek dictatorship, 
following a pragmatic policy par excellence. They concentrated on Greece’s 
allegiance to the Atlantic Alliance, continuing but also strengthening a 
“good working relationship”, including actively promoting trade. To achieve 
this, cooperation in all fields, and most importantly defence, was pursued, 
with visits on both sides serving the purpose of bringing London closer to 
Athens. The basic objectives of policy towards Greece were changed to reflect 
“a new spirit” in relations, whereby the government in London would not 
twist the junta’s arm over a return to constitutional rule and democratic 
liberties. The Conservatives followed what I call the doctrine of “disconnected 
responsibilities” (introduced earlier by Labour), making clear that the NATO 
and the Council of Europe contexts were completely different and separate, 
and that developments in one would not spill over onto the other. In this sense, 
the Tories lived up to the junta’s expectations of them, as a Western European 
conservative party with a strong affiliation to NATO. Greek ministers, knowing 
they could see eye to eye with their British counterparts, pushed for closer 
relations with Britain through constantly playing the security card, but also 
always asking for more in their dealings with London. The familiar tight-rope 
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act of Britain’s relations with the junta was also obvious under Heath, insofar 
as trade figures almost doubled and relations became warmer, but the British 
also failed to provide sufficient encouragement to the Markezinis experiment 
and were constrained by their participation in the European integration 
process. The Greek military regime, on the other hand, struggled to cultivate 
relations with Britain primarily for domestic and international prestige 
reasons. Whereas Whitehall pursued a policy of “good working relations” with 
the junta in order to promote British interests vis-à-vis NATO, Cyprus and 
trade, the leadership in Athens was interested in using British support to gain 
legitimacy internationally and domestically, as well as to secure quid pro quos.
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